In the first part of the 20th century, a group of law scholars offered engaging, and occasionally disconcerting, views on the role of judges and the relationship between law and politics in the United States. These legal realists borrowed methods from the social sciences to carefully study the law as experienced by lawyers, judges, and average citizens and promoted a progressive vision for American law and society. Legal realism investigated the nature of legal reasoning, the purpose of law, and the role of judges. The movement asked questions which reshaped the study of jurisprudence and continue to drive lively debates about the law and politics in classrooms, courtrooms, and even the halls of Congress. This thorough analysis provides an introduction to the ideas, context, and leading personalities of legal realism. It helps situate an important movement in legal theory in the context of American politics and political thought and will be of great interest to students of judicial politics, American constitutional development, and political theory.
John Henry Schlegel recovers a largely ignored aspect of American Legal Realism, a movement in legal thought in the 1920s and 1930s that sought to bring the modern notion of empirical science into the study and teaching of law. In this book, he explores individual Realist scholars' efforts to challenge the received notion that the study of law was primarily a matter of learning rules and how to manipulate them. He argues that empirical research was integral to Legal Realism, and he explores why this kind of research did not, finally, become a part of American law school curricula. Schlegel reviews the work of several prominent Realists but concentrates on the writings of Walter Wheeler Cook, Underhill Moore, and Charles E. Clark. He reveals how their interest in empirical research was a product of their personal and professional circumstances and demonstrates the influence of John Dewey's ideas on the expression of that interest. According to Schlegel, competing understandings of the role of empirical inquiry contributed to the slow decline of this kind of research by professors of law. Originally published in 1995. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.
This book demonstrates how legal realism offers important and unique jurisprudential insights that are not just a part of legal history, but are also relevant and useful for a contemporary understanding of legal theory.
Although he is widely regarded as the 'founding father' of realism in International Relations, this book argues that Hans J. Morgenthau's legal background has largely been neglected in discussions of his place in the 'canon' of IR theory. Morgenthau was a legal scholar of German-Jewish origins who arrived in the United States in 1938. He went on to become a distinguished professor of Political Science and a prominent commentator on international affairs. Rather than locate Morgenthau's intellectual heritage in the German tradition of 'Realpolitik', this book demonstrates how many of his central ideas and concepts stem from European and American legal debates of the 1920s and 1930s. This is an ambitious attempt to recast the debate on Morgenthau and will appeal to IR scholars interested in the history of realism as well as international lawyers engaged in debates regarding the relationship between law and politics, and the history of International Law.
Martin (philosophy, Boston U.) critically compares and evaluates two versions of an important movement in early 20th-century legal thought. For both he recounts its origins and early development, surveys its main proponents, and considers it as a research program. He also looks at its influence on critical legal studies. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.
This comprehensive presentation of Axel Hägerström (1868-1939) fills a void in nearly a century of literature, providing both the legal and political scholar and the non-expert reader with a proper introduction to the father of Scandinavian realism. Based on his complete work, including unpublished material and personal correspondence selected exclusively from the Uppsala archives, A Real Mind follows the chronological evolution of Hägerström’s intellectual enterprise and offers a full account of his thought. The book summarizes Hägerström’s main arguments while enabling further critical assessment, and tries to answer such questions as: If norms are neither true nor false, how can they be adequately understood on the basis of Hägerström’s theory of knowledge? Did the founder of the Uppsala school uphold emotivism in moral philosophy? What consequences does such a standpoint have in practical philosophy? Is he really the inspiration behind Scandinavian state absolutism?A Real Mind places the complex web of issues addressed by Hägerström within the broader context of 20th century philosophy, stretching from epistemology to ethics. His philosophy of law is examined in the core chapters of the book, with emphasis on the will-theory and the relation between law and power. The narrative is peppered with vignettes from Hägerström’s life, giving an insightful and highly readable portrayal of a thinker who put his imprint on legal theory. The appendix provides a selected bibliography and a brief synopsis of the major events in his life, both private and intellectual.
»Umwerfend und brillant, ein Klassiker!« Bestsellerautor John Green Die 16-jährige Starr lebt in zwei Welten: in dem verarmten Viertel, in dem sie wohnt, und in der Privatschule, an der sie fast die einzige Schwarze ist. Als Starrs bester Freund Khalil vor ihren Augen von einem Polizisten erschossen wird, rückt sie ins Zentrum der öffentlichen Aufmerksamkeit. Khalil war unbewaffnet. Bald wird landesweit über seinen Tod berichtet; viele stempeln Khalil als Gangmitglied ab, andere gehen in seinem Namen auf die Straße. Die Polizei und ein Drogenboss setzen Starr und ihre Familie unter Druck. Was geschah an jenem Abend wirklich? Die Einzige, die das beantworten kann, ist Starr. Doch ihre Antwort würde ihr Leben in Gefahr bringen...
Die von Hans Kelsen im Jahre 1934 vorgelegte "Reine Rechtslehre" gehört zu den rechtstheoretischen Schlüsselschriften des 20. Jahrhunderts. In ihr entwickelt Kelsen erstmals systematisch seine einerseits das Recht von der Moral, andererseits die Norm vom Faktum konsequent scheidende, ideologiekritische Rechtstheorie. Wer auf der Höhe der Zeit über Struktur und Geltung von Recht und die Eigenart von Rechtswissenschaft, kurz: wer über das Rechtliche am Recht nachdenken will, kommt an der "Reine[n] Rechtslehre" nicht vorbei. Die Erstauflage der "Reine[n] Rechtslehre", die weltweit in rund ein Dutzend Sprachen übersetzt worden ist, wurde in deutscher Sprache mehrfach nachgedruckt, ist indes derzeit vergriffen. Sie wird hier in Gestalt einer Studienausgabe vorgelegt, die am Recht Interessierte zum Hineinlesen ermutigen und zum kritischen Nach- und Weiterdenken einladen möchte.
60 years after the trials of the main German war criminals, the articles in this book attempt to assess the Nuremberg Trials from a historical and legal point of view, and to illustrate connections, contradictions and consequences. In view of constantly reoccurring reports of mass crimes from all over the world, we have only reached the halfway point in the quest for an effective system of international criminal justice. With the legacy of Nuremberg in mind, this volume is a contribution to the search for answers to questions of how the law can be applied effectively and those committing crimes against humanity be brought to justice for their actions.
This book reconstructs and classifies, according to ideal-typical models, the different positions taken by the major contemporary legal theories as to whether and how law relates to politics. It presents a possible explanation as to why different legal theories, though often reaching diametric results, somehow must still begin from common basic points.
Between the Levite at the gate and the judicial systems of our day is a long journey in courthouse government, but its basic structure remains the same - law, judge and process. Of the three, process is the most unstable - procedure and facts. Of the two, facts are the most intractable. While most of the law in books may seem to center about abstract theories, doctrines, princi ples, and rules, the truth is that most of it is designed in some way to escape the painful examination of the facts which bring parties in a particular case to court. Frequently the emphasis is on the rule of law as it is with respect to the negotiable instru ment which forbids inquiry behind its face; sometimes the empha sis is on men as in the case of the wide discretion given a judge or administrator; sometimes on the process, as in pleading to a refined issue, summary judgment, pre-trial conference, or jury trial designed to impose the dirty work of fact finding on laymen. The minds of the men of law never cease to labor at im proving process in the hope that some less painful, more trustworthy and if possible automatic method can be found to lay open or force litigants to disclose what lies inside their quarrel, so that law can be administered with dispatch and de cisiveness in the hope that truth and justice will be served.
Law and the Modern Mind first appeared in 1930 when, in the words of Judge Charles E. Clark, it "fell like a bomb on the legal world." In the generations since, its influence has grown--today it is accepted as a classic of general jurisprudence. The work is a bold and persuasive attack on the delusion that the law is a bastion of predictable and logical action. Jerome Frank's controversial thesis is that the decisions made by judge and jury are determined to an enormous extent by powerful, concealed, and highly idiosyncratic psychological prejudices that these decision-makers bring to the courtroom. Frank points out that legal verdicts are supposed to result from the application of legal rules to the facts of the suit--a procedure that sounds utterly methodical. Frank argues, that profound, immeasurable biases strongly influence the judge and jury's reaction to witnesses, lawyers, and litigants. As a result, we can never know what they will believe "the facts of the suit" to be. The trial's results become unforeseeable, the lawyer's advice unreliable, and the cause of justice insecure. This edition includes the author's final preface in which he answers two decades of criticism of his position.
Creativity, Law and Entrepreneurship explores the idea of creativity, its relationship to entrepreneurship, and the law's role in inhibiting and promoting it. Our inquiry into law and creativity reduces to an inquiry about what people do, what activities and actions they engage in. What unites law and creativity, work and play, is their shared origins in human activity, however motivated, to whatever purpose directed. In this work contributors from the US and Europe explore the ways in which law incentivizes particular types of activity as they develop themes related to emergent theories of entrepreneurship (public, private, and social); lawyering and the creative process; creativity in a business and social context; and, creativity and the construction of legal rights.
The Common Law is Oliver Wendell Holmes' most sustained work of jurisprudence. In it the careful reader will discern traces of his later thought as found in both his legal opinions and other writings. At the outset of The Common Law Holmes posits that he is concerned with establishing that the common law can meet the changing needs of society while preserving continuity with the past. A common law judge must be creative, both in determining the society's current needs, and in discerning how best to address these needs in a way that is continuous with past judicial decisions. In this way, the law evolves by moving out of its past, adapting to the needs of the present, and establishing a direction for the future. To Holmes' way of thinking, this approach is superior to imposing order in accordance with a philosophical position or theory because the law would thereby lose the flexibility it requires in responding to the needs and demands of disputing parties as well as society as a whole. According to Holmes, the social environment--the economic, moral, and political milieu--alters over time. Therefore in order to remain responsive to this social environment, the law must change as well. But the law is also part of this environment and impacts it. There is, then, a continual reciprocity between the law and the social arrangements in which it is contextualized. And, as with the evolution of species, there is no starting over. Rather, in most cases, a judge takes existing legal concepts and principles, as these have been memorialized in legal precedent, and adapts them, often unconsciously, to fit the requirements of a particular case and present social conditions.
An account of successive legal theories in England and America against a background of the varieties of natural law in the ancient, medieval and modern worlds. The outcome in Legal Realism provides insight into contemporary issues in law and the judicial process and their relation to moral philosophy. As Levy shows, legal theory has always been inspired by forces outside the law in philosophy and politics. In England the philosophy of Utilitarianism as expounded by Bentham and Austin brought legal positivism into prominence as an alternative to natural law. In the United States the philosophy of pragmatism spearheaded by James and Dewey and shared by Justice Holmes gave the functional turn resulting in the movement of Legal Realism. After sketching the background of varieties of natural law in the ancient, medieval, and modern worlds, Levy presents leading figures and trends in England and the United States. The book is written so as to be intelligible to lawyers, philosophers, and students of cultural history and social science.
Brian Leiter is widely recognized as the leading philosophical interpreter of the jurisprudence of American Legal Realism, as well as the most influential proponent of the relevance of the naturalistic turn in philosophy to the problems of legal philosophy. This volume collects newly revised versions of ten of his best-known essays, which set out his reinterpretation of the Legal Realists as prescient philosophical naturalists; critically engage with jurisprudential responses to Legal Realism, from legal positivism to Critical Legal Studies; connect the Realist program to the methodology debate in contemporary jurisprudence; and explore the general implications of a naturalistic world view for problems about the objectivity of law and morality. Leiter has supplied a lengthy new introductory essay, as well as postscripts to several of the essays, in which he responds to challenges to his interpretive and philosophical claims by academic lawyers and philosophers. This volume will be essential reading for anyone interested in jurisprudence, as well as for philosophers concerned with the consequences of naturalism in moral and legal philosophy.
Seit Jahrhunderten greift die Rechtsgeschichte für die Anfänge des institutionalisierten Rechtswesens auf selbstgeschaffene Mythen zurück. Der Entschlüsselung dieser Ursprungsmythen ist Marie Theres Fögens Buch gewidmet. Ihr geht es darum, aus den Erzählungen des Livius, Dionysios von Harlikarnass, Diodor, Cicero und anderer zu rekonstruieren, welches Bild die Römer sich von der Entstehung und Evolution ihres Rechts gemacht haben. Die einschlägigen Erzählungen, von der modernen Historiographie weitgehend verworfen, wirken literatur- und kunstgeschichtlich bis heute nach.Fögens reich illustriertes Buch lädt den Leser zur "Befehlsverweigerung", zur Aufhebung der Trennung von Fakten und Fiktionen ein und eröffnet ihm damit die "verlockende Chance, zu erfahren, wie die Römer sich erklärten, was wir so gerne wüssten".