Lawyer, judge, public figure, historian, theologian, and amateur natural philosopher, Sir Matthew Hale worked and wrote in the middle decades of the seventeenth century, perhaps the most turbulent period of English political history. His reflections on reason, law, and political authority,unpublished in his lifetime, are collected in this volume. It sets Hale's previously unpublished Treatise on the Nature of Laws in General and touching the Law of Nature and his "Reflections on Mr Hobbes his Dialogue of the Laws" in context of other key works of legal and constitutional theory. TheTreatise reveals a complex general understanding of law and of moral and legal reasoning. "Reflections" brings these general considerations to bear on English law, in his critical response to Hobbes's all-out attack on common-law jurisprudence. "Reflections" suggests a conception of judicialreasoning, and a view of political authority, that deepens the view Hale defends in the longer and more systematic work. His views on practical reasoning are elaborated and related explicitly to the discipline of law in his "Preface to Rolle's Abridgement" and in parts of his History of the CommonLaw. In the Treatise, Hale argues that human law is necessarily instituted in the practices and customs of specific communities, manifesting their consent; this view is enriched and deepened in the History and "Considerations touching Amendment of the Law". His views on the foundations of politicalauthority, sounded in the Treatise, are argued at length in Prerogatives of the King and "Reflections". "Reflections" argues for necessary legal limits of ruling power and Prerogatives offers a systematic discussion of the nature and limits of political authority. Taken together, these writingsoffer a rich and subtle articulation of a classical common-law understanding of law, reason and authority. Gerald J. Postema present these seminal writings in a modernized text for readers from philosophy, law, political theory, or intellectual history. He contributes an extended introduction setting out the theoretical and historical context of the works.
Volume 11, the sixth of the historical volumes of A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, offers a fresh, philosophically engaged, critical interpretation of the main currents of jurisprudential thought in the English-speaking world of the 20th century. It tells the tale of two lectures and their legacies: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s “The Path of Law” (1897) and H.L.A. Hart’s Holmes Lecture, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” (1958). Holmes’s radical challenge to late 19th century legal science gave birth to a rich variety of competing approaches to understanding law and legal reasoning from realism to economic jurisprudence to legal pragmatism, from recovery of key elements of common law jurisprudence and rule of law doctrine in the work of Llewellyn, Fuller and Hayek to root-and-branch attacks on the ideology of law by the Critical Legal Studies and Feminist movements. Hart, simultaneously building upon and transforming the undations of Austinian analytic jurisprudence laid in the early 20th century, introduced rigorous philosophical method to English-speaking jurisprudence and offered a reinterpretation of legal positivism which set the agenda for analytic legal philosophy to the end of the century and beyond. A wide-ranging debate over the role of moral principles in legal reasoning, sparked by Dworkin’s fundamental challenge to Hart’s theory, generated competing interpretations of and fundamental challenges to core doctrines of Hart’s positivism, including the nature and role of conventions at the foundations of law and the methodology of philosophical jurisprudence.
Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions in favour of precedent-following. This book examines the force and the limitations of these arguments and shows that although the principal requirement of the doctrine of precedent is that courts respect earlier judicial decisions on materially identical facts, the doctrine also requires courts to depart from such decisions when following them would perpetuate legal error or injustice. Not only do judicial precedents not 'bind' judges in the classical-positivist sense, but, were they to do so, they would be ill suited to common-law decision-making. Combining historical inquiry and philosophical analysis, this book will assist anyone seeking to understand how precedent operates as a common-law doctrine.
Modern jurisprudence embodies two distinct traditions of thought about the nature of law. The first adopts a scientific approach which assumes that all legal phenomena possess universal characteristics that may be used in the analysis of any type of legal system. The main task of the legal philosopher is to disclose and understand such characteristics, which are thought to be capable of establishment independently of any moral or political values which the law might promote, and of any other context-dependent features of legal systems. Another form of jurisprudential reflection views the law as a complex form of moral arrangement which can only be analyzed from within a system of reflective moral and political practices. Rather than conducting a search for neutral standpoints or criteria, this second form of theorizing suggests that we uncover the nature and purpose of the law by reflecting on the dynamic properties of legal practice. Can legal philosophy aspire to scientific values of reasoning and truth? Is the idea of neutral standpoints an illusion? Should legal theorizing be limited to the analysis of particular practices? Are the scientific and juristic approaches in the end as rigidly distinct from one another as some have claimed? In a series of important new essays the authors of Jurisprudence or Legal Science? attempt to answer these and other questions about the nature of jurisprudential thinking, whilst emphasizing the connection of such 'methodological' concerns to the substantive legal issues which have traditionally defined the core of jurisprudential speculation.
Roger North is known today as a biographer and writer on music, architecture and estate management. Yet his writings, including thousands of pages still in manuscript, also contain critical reflections about intellectual and social changes taking place in England. This feature is little recognised, because North's reputation as an author was formed between 1740 and 1890, when seven of his manuscripts were published in editions that drastically altered his original texts, and when the reception of these works was influenced by 'Whig' criticism. Although some of North's writings were later edited according to more rigorous standards, many critics still utilise the discredited editions and continue to repeat 'Whig' stereotypes of North. Eschewing such stereotypes, Jamie C. Kassler provides the first interpretation of North's philosophy by retrieving what is consistent in his pattern of thought and by analysing some of his practices and purposes as a writer. By these methods, she shows that North, a common lawyer by profession, combined the moral scepticism of Montaigne with the legal philosophy of Coke, Selden and Hale. The result was a sceptical philosophy that accounts for North's critical reflections on the dogmatism of natural-law doctrine, both in its medieval intellectualist version and in its voluntarist reformulation that began with Grotius and was developed by Hobbes, Pufendorf and Locke. Kassler bases her interpretation on a wide range of North's writings, even those in which one might least expect to find a philosophy. In addition, one of his manuscripts, which is edited here for the first time, includes an exposition of his jurisprudence, as well as his attempt to bring England's past into the legal tradition. These features form part of North's broader argument that language, including the language of law, is the invention of humans and a representation of their changing history and habits, an argument that he later extended to musical 'language' in his more finished essay, 'The Musicall Grammarian' (1728).
Die von Hans Kelsen im Jahre 1934 vorgelegte "Reine Rechtslehre" gehört zu den rechtstheoretischen Schlüsselschriften des 20. Jahrhunderts. In ihr entwickelt Kelsen erstmals systematisch seine einerseits das Recht von der Moral, andererseits die Norm vom Faktum konsequent scheidende, ideologiekritische Rechtstheorie. Wer auf der Höhe der Zeit über Struktur und Geltung von Recht und die Eigenart von Rechtswissenschaft, kurz: wer über das Rechtliche am Recht nachdenken will, kommt an der "Reine[n] Rechtslehre" nicht vorbei. Die Erstauflage der "Reine[n] Rechtslehre", die weltweit in rund ein Dutzend Sprachen übersetzt worden ist, wurde in deutscher Sprache mehrfach nachgedruckt, ist indes derzeit vergriffen. Sie wird hier in Gestalt einer Studienausgabe vorgelegt, die am Recht Interessierte zum Hineinlesen ermutigen und zum kritischen Nach- und Weiterdenken einladen möchte.
Das Handbuch Amerikanische Rechtspraxis wendet sich in erster Linie an deutsche Anwälte, die mit dem amerikanischen oder englischen Recht in der Praxis in Berührung kommen, kann aber auch von international tätigen Unternehmen mit Gewinn genutzt werden. Thematisch umfaßt die Darstellung vor allem die Bereiche Zivilprozessrecht, Strafprozessrecht, Vertragsrecht, enthält zusätzlich Formulierungsmuster und Musterverträge sowie zahlreiche Praxistipps.
Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) ist der wichtigste Vertreter des frühen aufgeklärten Naturrechts, der Theoretiker der Toleranz und des Gewissens. Es gibt in Deutschland keinen Juristen und Philosophen vor Kant, l der politisch zentrale Begriffe wie Natur- und Menschenrecht, moralische Person und Toleranz so gründlich und so wirkmächtig bestimmt hat. An Pufendorf zu erinnern, stärkt die eigenen Traditionen. Rechtsstaatlichkeit muss so nicht als Belehrung von außen, sondern kann als authochthone und somit als natürliche Rechtsform aufgefasst werden - es gibt keine stärkeren Argumente für die Stabilität des Rechts, als wenn Naturrecht, regionales Recht und geschichtliches Recht zusammenfallen.