This new book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other's contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law.
In this book Dimitrios Kyritsis advances an original account of constitutional review of primary legislation for its compatibility with human rights. Key to it is the value of separation of powers. When the relationship between courts and the legislature realizes this value, it makes a stronger claim to moral legitimacy. Kyritsis steers a path between the two extremes of the sceptics and the enthusiasts. Against sceptics who claim that constitutional review is an affront to democracy he argues that it is a morally legitimate institutional option for democratic societies because it can provide an effective check on the legislature. Although the latter represents the people and should thus be given the initiative in designing government policy, it carries serious risks, which institutional design must seek to avert. Against enthusiasts he maintains that fundamental rights protection is not the exclusive province of courts but the responsibility of both the judiciary and the legislature. Although courts may sometimes be given the power to scrutinize legislation and even strike it down, if it violates human rights, they must also respect the legislature's important contribution to their joint project. Occasionally, they may even have a duty to defer to morally sub-optimal decisions, as far as rights protection is concerned. This is as it should be. Legitimacy demands less than the ideal. In turn, citizens ought to accept discounts on perfect justice for the sake of achieving a reasonably just and effective political order overall.
Zwischen Rechtsverständnissen, nach denen es nur juridische, nicht aber moralische Rechte geben kann, und einem individualethischen Ansatz, nach dem Personen moralische Rechte haben, gibt es einen anhaltenden Streit. Im Kontext mit der Bestimmung des Verhältnisses von Recht und Moral gibt es darüber hinaus ein zweites Spannungsfeld: die Frage, ob das Recht einer Begründung durch Moral bedarf, wenn es nicht nur auf Legalität, sondern auch auf Legitimität Anspruch erheben will. Die Beiträge dieses Bandes sind - kontrovers - Differenzierungen zwischen Recht, Moral und Ethik und den Fragen gewidmet, wie sich Moral und Recht zueinander verhalten und ob moralische Ansprüche als Rechte verstanden werden können. Weitere Themen sind Gründe für die Transformation moralischer Ansprüche in positives Recht, der moralische Inhalt und die positiv-rechtliche Form der Menschen- und Grundrechte und philosophische Wege zu Ethik und Recht am Beispiel der gegenwärtigen arabisch-islamischen Philosophie. Inhalt: Hans Jörg Sandkühler: Moral und Recht? Recht oder Moral? Zur Einführung -.- Dietmar von der Pfordten: Zur Differenzierung von Recht, Moral und Ethik -.- Georg Mohr: Gibt es moralische Rechte? -.- Dagmar Borchers: Moralische Rechte - wie steht der Utilitarismus heute dazu? -.- Sarhan Dhouib: Philosophische Wege zu Ethik und Recht. Beispiele aus derarabisch-islamischen Philosophie der Gegenwart -.- Georg Lohmann: Die moralische und die juridische Dimension der Menschenrechte -.- Heiner Bielefeldt: Menschenwürde: der Grund der Menschenrechte -.- Herlinde Pauer-Studer: Verletzung von Menschenrechten.
Die von Hans Kelsen im Jahre 1934 vorgelegte "Reine Rechtslehre" gehört zu den rechtstheoretischen Schlüsselschriften des 20. Jahrhunderts. In ihr entwickelt Kelsen erstmals systematisch seine einerseits das Recht von der Moral, andererseits die Norm vom Faktum konsequent scheidende, ideologiekritische Rechtstheorie. Wer auf der Höhe der Zeit über Struktur und Geltung von Recht und die Eigenart von Rechtswissenschaft, kurz: wer über das Rechtliche am Recht nachdenken will, kommt an der "Reine[n] Rechtslehre" nicht vorbei. Die Erstauflage der "Reine[n] Rechtslehre", die weltweit in rund ein Dutzend Sprachen übersetzt worden ist, wurde in deutscher Sprache mehrfach nachgedruckt, ist indes derzeit vergriffen. Sie wird hier in Gestalt einer Studienausgabe vorgelegt, die am Recht Interessierte zum Hineinlesen ermutigen und zum kritischen Nach- und Weiterdenken einladen möchte.
‘This is an outline of a coherence theory of law. Its basic ideas are: reasonable support and weighing of reasons. All the rest is commentary.’ These words at the beginning of the preface of this book perfectly indicate what On Law and Reason is about. It is a theory about the nature of the law which emphasises the role of reason in the law and which refuses to limit the role of reason to the application of deductive logic. In 1989, when the first edition of On Law and Reason appeared, this book was ground breaking for several reasons. It provided a rationalistic theory of the law in the language of analytic philosophy and based on a thorough understanding of the results, including technical ones, of analytic philosophy. That was not an obvious combination at the time of the book’s first appearance and still is not. The result is an analytical rigor that is usually associated with positivist theories of the law, combined with a philosophical position that is not natural law in a strict sense, but which shares with it the emphasis on the role of reason in determining what the law is. If only for this rare combination, On Law and Reason still deserves careful study. On Law and Reason also foreshadowed and influenced a development in the field of Legal Logic that would take place in the nineties of the 20th century, namely the development of non-monotonic (‘defeasible’) logics for the analysis of legal reasoning. In the new Introduction to this second edition, this aspect is explored in some more detail.
This volume offers different perspectives on judicial practice in the European and American contexts, both arguably characterized in the last decades by the emergence of novel normative and even policy arguments by judges. The central question deserving the attention of the contributors concerns the degree in which judicial exercises in practical reasoning may amount to forms of judicial usurpation of the legislative function by courts. Since different views as to the nature and scope of legal reasoning lead to different degrees of tolerance regarding what should be admissible to courts, that same nature and scope is thoroughly debated. The main disciplinary approach is that of general jurisprudence, but the contributions take stock of other disciplines in which judicial activism has been addressed, namely positive theories of judicial behavior. Accordingly, the book also explores the development of interdisciplinary dialogue about the theme.
This handbook addresses legal reasoning and argumentation from a logical, philosophical and legal perspective. The main forms of legal reasoning and argumentation are covered in an exhaustive and critical fashion, and are analysed in connection with more general types (and problems) of reasoning. Accordingly, the subject matter of the handbook divides in three parts. The first one introduces and discusses the basic concepts of practical reasoning. The second one discusses the general structures and procedures of reasoning and argumentation that are relevant to legal discourse. The third one looks at their instantiations and developments of these aspects of argumentation as they are put to work in the law, in different areas and applications of legal reasoning.
Dickinson [1894-1952] examines the relationship between administrative tribunals and the courts, and problems that arise from the judicial review of administrative determinations. Dickinson is especially concerned with factors that determine the scope and purposes of a review. His study is notable in part because it offers a near-contemporary assessment of the Hepburn amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act (1906) and other changes enacted in the early 1900s.
By showing how Kelsen's theory of law works alongside his political philosophy, the book shows the Pure Theory to be part of a wider attempt to understand how political power can be legitimately exercised in pluralist societies.
In the modern administrative state, hundreds if not thousands of officials wield powers that can be used to the benefit or detriment of individuals and corporations. When the exercise of these powers is challenged, a great deal can be at stake. Courts are confronted with difficult questions about how to apply the general principles of administrative law in different contexts. Based on a comparative theoretical analysis of the allocation of authority between the organs of government, A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law provides courts with a methodology to apply no matter how complex the subject matter. The firm theoretical foundation of deference is fully exposed and a comprehensive doctrine of curial deference is developed for application by courts in judicial review of administrative action. A wide scope is urged, spanning the whole spectrum of government regulation, thereby ensuring wide access to public law remedies.
Since its first publication in 1996, Law and Morality has filled a long-standing need for a contemporary Canadian textbook in the philosophy of law. Now in its third edition, this anthology has been thoroughly revised and updated, and includes new chapters on equality, judicial review, and terrorism and the rule of law. The volume begins with essays that explore general questions about morality and law, surveying the traditional literature on legal positivism and contemporary debates about the connection between law and morality. These essays explore the tensions between law as a protector of individual liberty and as a tool of democratic self-rule, and introduce debates about adjudication and the contribution of feminist approaches to the philosophy of law. New material on the Chinese Canadian head tax case is also featured. The second part of Law and Morality deals with philosophical questions as they apply to contemporary issues. Excerpts from judicial decisions as well as essays by practicing lawyers are included to provide theoretically informed legal analyses of the issues. Striking a balance between practical and more analytic, philosophical approaches, the volume's treatment of the philosophy of law as a branch of political philosophy enables students to understand law in its function as a social institution. Law and Morality has proved to be an essential text in both departments of philosophy and faculties of law and this latest edition brings the debates fully up to date, filling gaps in the previous editions and adding to the array of contemporary issues previously covered.
»Der Fuchs weiß viele Dinge, aber der Igel weiß eine große Sache.« Der griechische Dichter Archilochos hat diesen Satz formuliert, Isaiah Berlin hat ihn mit seinem Tolstoi-Essay berühmt gemacht. Aber was ist diese »eine große Sache«? Ronald Dworkin liefert eine Antwort: Es sind Werte in all ihren Erscheinungsformen. Wenn wir verstehen wollen, was Wahrheit und Schönheit sind, was dem Leben Sinn verleiht, was die Moral fordert und die Gerechtigkeit verlangt, so müssen wir der Spur jener moralischen Einstellungen nachgehen, die menschliches Denken, Fühlen und Handeln durchdringen und zu einer Einheit formen. »Gerechtigkeit für Igel« ist eines jener Bücher, wie es sie in Zeiten der Füchse – der Spezialisten und Skeptiker – immer seltener gibt: eines, das aus einem einzigen Prinzip eine ganze Welt erklären und zugleich Orientierung geben möchte.
English summary: This volume deals with the contract law of the European legal systems. What are the essential rules of these systems on the formation and validity of contracts? What rules apply to a party's right to bring a claim for performance, to terminate the contract or to claim damages for breach? While the discussion is based on the national rules, they are taken into account only as local variations on a European theme. To what extent is it therefore possible to speak of a common European law of contract? What contributions do the "Principles of European Contract Law" and the proposal of the "Draft Common Frame of Reference" make? This book is not only aimed at helping to teach young Europeans lawyers, but also strives to assist those engaged in the reform of national contract law or the drafting of uniform European legislation. The first 1996 edition of the volume has now been updated and completed. German description: Unter "Europaischem Vertragsrecht" versteht dieses Buch die Regeln, die den Rechtsordnungen der europaischen Lander gemeinsam sind: Wie kommt ein gultiger Vertrag zustande? Nach welchen Regeln wird beurteilt, ob eine Vertragspartei die Erfullung des Vertrages verlangen, von dem Vertrag Abstand nehmen, ihn widerrufen oder kundigen oder den Kontrahenten auf Schadensersatz in Anspruch nehmen kann? Lassen sich auf dem Gebiet des Vertragsrechts gemeineuropaische Strukturen auffinden? Gibt es allgemein akzeptierte Regeln? Wie sind sie zu formulieren, wenn man die "Prinzipien des Europaischen Vertragsrechts" oder die Vorschlage des "Draft Common Frame of Reference" berucksichtigt? Dabei werden die Losungen der nationalen Rechtsordnungen ausfuhrlich - wenn auch stets nur als nationale Variationen eines europaischen Themas - behandelt. Das Buch kann deshalb bei der rechtsvergleichenden Ausbildung der jungen europaischen Juristen eine Rolle spielen, ferner auch dort, wo e s um die Vorbereitung europaischen Gesetzesrechts oder um die Reform der nationalen Vertragsrechte geht. Das Buch ist in einer ersten unvollstandigen Auflage schon 1996 erschienen. Die Neuauflage bringt den Text auf den neuen Stand und erganzt ihn um die damals noch fehlenden Abschnitte.
English summary: This book integrates the problem of violence in societies in a larger historical and social science context, showing how economic and political behaviour are closely linked. Most societies limit violence by political manipulation of the economy to create privileged interests. Privileges limit the use of violence by powerful individuals, but hinder both economic and political development of such natural states . In contrast, modern societies are characterized by open access to economic and political organizations, thereby fostering political and economic competition (democracy and markets) and general development. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast provide a framework for understanding the two types of orders and show in which ways a number of countries have achieved the transition between them. German description: Alle Gesellschaften mussen sich mit der Moglichkeit wie der Realitat von Gewalt auseinandersetzen; sie tun das auf unterschiedliche Art. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis und Barry R. Weingast stellen das Problem der Gewalt in einen grosseren sozialwissenschaftlichen und historischen Zusammenhang und zeigen, wie eng wirtschaftliches und politisches Verhalten verbunden sind. Die meisten aus der Geschichte bekannten Gesellschaften, von den Autoren als naturliche Staaten bezeichnet, begrenzen Gewaltanwendung vorbeugend, indem sie durch politische Einflussnahme auf die Wirtschaftstatigkeit privilegierte Interessen schaffen. Diese Privilegien reduzieren den Einsatz von Gewalt von Seiten machtiger Einzelner; es wird auf diese Weise jedoch die wirtschaftliche ebenso wie die politische Entwicklung solcher Staaten behindert. Denn fur die grosse Mehrheit der Nicht-Privilegierten ist der Zugang zu Politik und Wirtschaft dadurch beschrankt.Im Unterschied hierzu schaffen moderne Gesellschaften Zugangsfreiheit zu wirtschaftlichen und politischen Organisationen (Unternehmen, Markten, Parlamenten, hoheitlichen Einrichtungen) und fordern damit den politischen wie den wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerb und somit die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung. Das Buch bietet ein gedankliches Gerust zum Verstandnis der zwei Typen von Gesellschaftsordnungen, die es an historischen Beispielen von der romischen Antike bis ins 19. Jahrhundert veranschaulicht. Anhand dieses Konzepts wird erklart, wieso Gesellschaften mit Zugangsfreiheit sowohl politisch wie wirtschaftlich hoher entwickelt sind und auf welche Weise seit dem 19. Jahrhundert rund 25 Lander den Ubergang vom einen Typus zum anderen geschafft haben.
NOW UPDATED TO 2004 - see Supplements"This book is much more than a casebook. It contains a wide range of materials, including excerpts from a broad range of writers and commentators. The contents of the book do provide, as the authors claim in their preface, 'the materials and commentary needed to understand the doctrines and theories behind the law'.More than that, it contains materials relevant to many questions of general interest such as the role of the courts, the appointment and removal of judges and the republican debate, to mention but a few.... Indeed it is surprising how much the authors have succeeded in including in the book."Sir Anthony Mason AC KBE, former Chief Justice, High Court of Australia, reviewing a previous edition.There are many changes incorporated in this new 3rd edition, includes:All developments in the law since the last edition (for example, Egan v Willis, the Hindmarsh Island Bridge case, the Tampa case, Sue v Hill, Breckler, the cross-vesting cases and the latest case law and legislation in the migration area)New scholarly works as extracts (eg, from the new Goldsworthy book on The Sovereignty of Parliament) and listed in the further readinga new section on the Fiji crisisnew material on citizenshipan expanded chapter on Indigenous issues, including the latest on Mabo and native title and the work of the Council for Aboriginal ReconciliationMore material reflecting the interaction between international law and the ConstitutionRevamped sections on the drafting and creation of the Constitution and Federation though to popular sovereigntyUpdated material on the Republic debate and the reconciliation processNew chapters to take into account the above developments and a streamlining of existing chaptersa new section on constitutionalism and revolutions

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