While indeterminacy is a recurrent theme in philosophy, less progress has been made in clarifying its significance for various philosophical and interdisciplinary contexts. This collection brings together early-career and well-known philosophers—including Graham Priest, Trish Glazebrook, Steven Crowell, Robert Neville, Todd May, and William Desmond—to explore indeterminacy in greater detail. The volume is unique in that its essays demonstrate the positive significance of indeterminacy, insofar as indeterminacy opens up new fields of discourse and illuminates neglected aspects of various concepts and phenomena. The essays are organized thematically around indeterminacy’s impact on various areas of philosophy, including post-Kantian idealism, phenomenology, ethics, hermeneutics, aesthetics, and East Asian philosophy. They also take an interdisciplinary approach by elaborating the conceptual connections between indeterminacy and literature, music, religion, and science.
Robert Kane provides a critical overview of debates about free will of the past half century, relating this recent inquiry to the broader history of the free will issue and to vital currents of twentieth century thought. Kane also defends a traditional libertarian or incompatibilist view of free will (one that insists upon the incompatibility of free will and determinism), employing arguments that are both new to philosophy and that respond to contemporary developments in physics and biology, neuro science, and the cognitive and behavioral sciences.
Dieser Sammelband vereint Beiträge, die sich mit der Philosophie von Harry G. Frankfurt auseinandersetzen; er liefert einen umfassenden Überblick über die internationale Diskussion seines Werks.
As the argument of Indeterminacy and Intelligibility develops, Martine shows that indeterminacy in our experience in logically bound to the determinate dimensions of thought and practice. Continuing the investigation that began in his earlier book Individuals and Individuality, the author draws concrete experience together with abstract reflection to reveal the ontological relation between determinacy and indeterminacy that lies at the very core of our drive to understand.
This book discusses the ideas of Donald Davidson, on the nature of understanding and meaning, and the nature of truth and knowledge, providing an account of Davidson's holistic and hermeneutical conception of linguistic interpretation, and, more generally, of the mind.
Annotation A volume in the SUNY series in Political Theory: Contemporary Issues Philip Green, editor and A volume in the SUNY series in Radical Social and Political Theory Roger S. Gottlieb, editor.
This collection brings together recent scholarship on Frege, including new translations of German material which is made available to Anglophone scholars for the first time.
Die Welt gibt es nicht. Aber das bedeutet nicht, dass es überhaupt nichts gibt. Mit Freude an geistreichen Gedankenspielen, Sprachwitz und Mut zur Provokation legt der Philosoph Markus Gabriel dar, dass es zwar nichts gibt, was es nicht gibt – die Welt aber unvollständig ist. Wobei noch längst nicht alles gut ist, nur weil es alles gibt. Und Humor hilft durchaus dabei, sich mit den Abgründen des menschlichen Seins auseinanderzusetzen.
Offers a pragmatically oriented reconstruction of the central issues of time.
To introduce this collection of research studies, which stem from the pro grams conducted by The World Phenomenology Institute, we need say a few words about our aims and work. This will bring to light the significance of the present volume. The phenomenological philosophy is an unprejudiced study of experience in its entire range: experience being understood as yielding objects. Experi ence, moreover, is approached in a specific way, such a way that it legitima tizes itself naturally in immediate evidence. As such it offers a unique ground for philosophical inquiry. Its basic condition, however, is to legitimize its validity. In this way it allows a dialogue to unfold among various philosophies of different methodologies and persuasions, so that their basic assumptions and conceptions may be investigated in an objective fashion. That is, instead of comparing concepts, we may go below their differences to seek together what they are meant to grasp. We may in this way come to the things them selves, which are the common objective of all philosophy, or what the great Chinese philosopher Wang Yang Ming called "the investigation of things". It is in this spirit that the Institute's programs include a "cross-cultural" dialogue meant to bring about a profound communication among philosophers in their deepest concerns. Rising above artificial cultural confinements, such dialogues bring scholars, thinkers and human beings together toward a truly human community of minds. Our Institute unfolds one consistent academic program.
This book traces the significance that the modulations of sensory perception have had for thinking about aesthetics and art in the last two and a half centuries. Beyond a discussion of the philosophical significance of beauty, or of the puzzle of aesthetic representation, aesthetics is conceived broadly as a means of describing our relationship to the world in terms of the habits of perception, and indeed the overturning of these habits, as in the modernist aesthetic of defamiliarisation. In the light of the ideas of the contemporary German aesthetic theorist, Wolfgang Welsch, this book offers the first discussion of the theory and practice of art that operates at the poles of perception: sensory experience that exceeds conceptual organisation, and the imperceptible, or what Welsch calls the 'anaesthetic'. These seemingly opposite poles have many parallels: a comparable indeterminacy of meaning and a similar challenge to representation, but also a shared focus on the habits and modulations of sensory perception and a similar interrogation of the boundary between art and that which surrounds it. The author applies the categories discussed to art practice, in particular to the theatre of Peter Handke, Samuel Beckett and Heiner Muller."
This book has arisen out of lectures I gave in recent years at the Uni versities of Munich and Regensburg, and it is intended to serve as a textbook for courses in the Philosophy of Language. In my lectures I was able to presuppose that the students had taken an introductory course in logic. Some knowledge of logic will also be helpful in studying this book - as it is almost everywhere else in philosophy -, especially in Section 3. 2, but it is no prerequisite. I would like to give my sincere thanks to Prof. Terrell for his excellent translation of the book, which is based on the second, revised and en larged German edition. Regensburg, May 1975 FRANZ VON KUTSCHERA INTRODUCTION Language has become one of philosophy's most important and pressing themes during this century. This preoccupation with language has its ori gins in the most diverse areas of philosophical inquiry.
I. MASS TERMS, COUNT TERMS, AND SORTAL TERMS Central examples of mass terms are easy to come by. 'Water', 'smoke', 'gold', etc. , differ in their syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties from count terms such as 'man', 'star', 'wastebasket', etc. Syntactically, it seems, mass terms do, but singular count terms do not, admit the quantifier phrases 'much', 'an amount of', 'a little', etc. The typical indefinite article for them is 'some' (unstressed)!, and this article cannot be used with singular count terms. Count terms, but not mass terms, use the quantifiers 'each', 'every', 'some', 'few', 'many'; and they use 'a(n)' as the indefinite article. They can, unlike the mass terms, take numerals as prefixes. Mass terms seem not to have a plural. Semantically, philo sophers have characterized count terms as denoting (classes of?) indi vidual objects, whereas what mass terms denote are cumulative and dissective. (That is, a mass term is supposed to be true of any sum of things (stuff) it is true of, and true of any part of anything of which it is true). Pragmatically, it seems that speakers use count terms when they wish to refer to individual objects, or when they wish to reidentify a particular already introduced into discoursc. Given a "space appropriate" to a count term C, it makes sense to ask how many C's there are in that space.
Challenges the conventional view of the nature of time.
John Dewey ranks as the most influential of America's philosophers. That in fluence stems, in part, from the originality of his mind, the breadth of his in terests, and his capacity to synthesize materials from diverse sources. In addi tion, Dewey was blessed with a long life and the extraordinary energy to express his views in more than 50 books, approximately 750 articles, and at least 200 contributions to encyclopedias. He has made enduring intellectual contributions in all of the traditional fields of philosophy, ranging from studies primarily of interest for philosophers in logic, epistemology, and metaphysics to books and articles of wider appeal in ethics, political philosophy, religion, aesthetics, and education. Given the extent of Dewey's own writings and the many books and articles on his views by critics and defenders, it may be asked why there is a need for any further examination of his philosophy. The need arises because the lapse of time since his death in 1952 now permits a new generation of scholars to approach his work in a different spirit. Dewey is no longer a living partisan of causes, sparking controversy over the issues of the day. He is no longer the advocate of a new point of view which calls into question the basic assump tions of rival philosophical schools and receives an almost predictable criticism from their entrenched positions. His works have now become classics.
By North-American standards, philosophy is not new in Quebec: the first men tion of philosophy lectures given by a Jesuit in the College de Quebec (founded 1635) dates from 1665, and the oldest logic manuscript dates from 1679. In English-speaking universities such as McGill (founded 1829), philosophy began to be taught later, during the second half of the 19th century. The major influence on English-speaking philosophers was, at least initially, that of Scottish Empiricism. On the other hand, the strong influence of the Catholic Church on French-Canadian society meant that the staff of the facultes of the French-speaking universities consisted, until recently, almost entirely of Thomist philosophers. There was accordingly little or no work in modern Formal Logic and Philosophy of Science and precious few contacts between the philosophical communities. In the late forties, Hugues Leblanc was a young student wanting to learn Formal Logic. He could not find anyone in Quebec to teach him and he went to study at Harvard University under the supervision of W. V. Quine. His best friend Maurice L' Abbe had left, a year earlier, for Princeton to study with Alonzo Church. After receiving his Ph. D from Harvard in 1948, Leblanc started his profes sional career at Bryn Mawr College, where he stayed until 1967. He then went to Temple University, where he taught until his retirement in 1992, serving as Chair of the Department of Philosophy from 1973 until 1979.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall we have been told that no alternative to Western capitalism is possible or desirable. This book challenges this view with two arguments. First, the above premise ignores the enormous variety within capitalism itself. Second, there are enormous forces of transformation within contemporary capitalisms, associated with moves towards a more knowledge-intensive economy. These forces challenge the traditional bases of contract and employment, and could lead to a quite different socio-economic system. Without proposing a static blueprint, this book explores this possible scenario.
This book surveys the discipline of linguistics, the study of human language. An outline of the ways in which language has been defined, described, and explored is provided, and readers are guided towards further exploration.